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Save the Peaks Coalition v. United States Forest Service, 683 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).
John M. Newman
ABSTRACT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit imposed personal sanctions
upon plaintiffs’ attorney for needlessly litigating an adjudicated NEPA claim and
misrepresenting the merit of that claim to his clients. The court held that plaintiffs, though aware
of the initial suit involving the claim, were misled by counsel into pursuing the claim in the
instant suit, and therefore should not be sanctioned with an award of defendants’ attorneys’ fees.
The court found plaintiffs’ counsel acted in bad faith, and intended to harass defendants and
cause delays in development. Consequently, the court awarded defendants all litigation costs
through trial and appeal. The court imposed sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and through its
inherent powers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Save the Peaks Coalition v. United States Forest Service,1 a three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held plaintiffs’ counsel personally responsible for relitigating an adjudicated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) claim in bad faith.2
Accordingly, the court sanctioned plaintiffs’ attorney for abuse of the judicial process, yet spared
plaintiffs themselves.3 The court awarded defendants all litigation costs incurred through trial
and appeal, to be paid personally by plaintiffs’ counsel.4 The court imposed the sanction via
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Federal statute,5 as well as through exercise of its inherent powers, after finding plaintiffs’
attorney acted in bad faith.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This sanction levy arises out of the second of two lawsuits concerning the United States
Forest Service’s (USFS) 2005 decision to permit Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership
(Snowbowl) to upgrade its operation with snowmaking equipment utilizing Class A+ reclaimed
wastewater.7 Snowbowl experiences tremendous variability in its annual natural snowfall
accumulation and, consequently, high fluctuation in visitor numbers.8 The snowmaking proposal
acted as a hedge against that variability and was consistent with other recreational uses of Class
A+ reclaimed wastewater in the nearby city of Flagstaff. The USFS vetted the proposal in a
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) published on February 2, 2004.9 After receiving
over 5,000 comments on the DEIS, the USFS issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FEIS) in February 2005.10 The FEIS included a specific analysis of snowmaking water quality
and a discussion of potential health effects resulting from the water’s use.11
In June 2005, four groups of plaintiffs, including several Native American tribes, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona challenging the USFS’s
decision in the FEIS. The suits were subsequently consolidated into a single action under Navajo
Nation v. United States Forest Service.12 In Navajo Nation, plaintiffs alleged, in part pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act, USFS violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA), NEPA, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Endangered Species Act, the
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Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act, and the National Forest Management Act, as
well as a violation of Federal tribal trust responsibilities.13 On motion for summary judgment,
plaintiffs alleged, for the first time, a failure by the USFS to adequately address health risks
resulting from ingesting snow made with the Class A+ wastewater. The district court denied
plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for leave to amend their complaint to include this new allegation.14
The district court then denied plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on all but the RFRA
claim, which the court decided in favor of defendants following a bench trial.15
On appeal, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s ruling in favor of the USFS.16 Particularly, the court reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on the NEPA claim related to manmade snow ingestion.17
Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s decision and affirmed the
district court judgment on all claims.18 The court’s affirmation relative to the NEPA claim
turned on procedure.19 The court held that, because plaintiffs “failed sufficiently to present” the
claim at the trial level, and because plaintiffs “failed to appeal the district court’s denial of their
motion to amend [their] complaint,” it would not hear the NEPA claim.20 Plaintiffs appealed the
en banc Ninth Circuit decision to the United States Supreme Court; certiorari was denied.21
In Save the Peaks Coalition, plaintiffs filed the instant suit in the District of Arizona
following this prior judgment in favor of the USFS.22 The suit’s NEPA claims hinged in large
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part on the failed allegation implicating health risks from ingested man-made snow proffered and
rejected in Navajo Nation. Plaintiffs claimed the USFS “failed to ensure the scientific integrity
of its analysis” through its inadequate discussion of the impacts of treated-water snow
ingestion.23 Again finding for defendants on all claims, the district court held plaintiffs’ claims
were barred by the doctrine of laches, and the USFS took the “requisite hard look at the
environmental effects of the proposed challenged action” as required by NEPA.24
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit levied strong criticism at plaintiffs and their attorney for
pursuing claims against the USFS nearly identical to those fully adjudicated in Navajo Nation.25
The court reversed the district court’s holding regarding the applicability of laches, holding that,
in light of the lack of prejudice experienced by the USFS, the elements of the doctrine were not
fully met.26 However, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of defendants on the
NEPA claims, and the USFS prevailed.27 On the issue of plaintiffs’ indiscretion, the Court
opined that the alleged “new” parties in the instant litigation were familiar with, even secondarily
involved in, the litigation in Navajo Nation and strategically declined to join that lawsuit.28 The
Court reasoned that, based on the similarity of the previous and instant claims, the instant suit
seemed designed “for no apparent reason other than to ensure further delay and forestall
development [of Snowbowl’s snowmaking system].”29 Further, the Court found the participation
of Plaintiffs’ attorney in both suits significant: “the ‘new’ plaintiffs and their counsel have
grossly abused the judicial process by . . . holding back claims that could have, and should have,
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been asserted in the first lawsuit . . . but for counsel’s procedural errors in raising those
claims.”30
III. ANALYSIS
The most recent Ninth Circuit court contemplating sanctions in this case was acutely
familiar with the parties’ protracted history; indeed the sanction panel consisted of the same
Circuit judges who considered plaintiffs’ second appeal.31 With that history in mind, the court
considered appropriate sanctions.
Though an award of attorney’s fees is generally appropriate when an opposing party
pursues an “unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious” action,32 the court held such an
award “inequitable” in this instance because plaintiffs themselves were not primarily responsible
for the conduct at issue.33 The court declined to award defendants attorney’s fees for two
reasons: (1) plaintiffs’ counsel appeared to have “misled” plaintiffs as to the “issues that
remained part of the appeal;” and (2) plaintiffs’ counsel served pro bono.34
However, the court found a statutory basis for imposing a litigation-costs sanction upon
plaintiffs’ attorney, personally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.35 Federal law provides that any
individual, attorney or otherwise, who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously” may be held personally responsible for reimbursement of costs and/or fees incurred
as a result of that multiplication.36 Concomitant with § 1927 sanctions must be a finding of
subjective bad faith. Bad faith arises from purposeful pursuit of frivolous claims, pursuit of
legitimate claims in order to oppress or annoy, or any other action specifically designed to delay
30
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or increase expenses.37 The court held that the plaintiffs’ attorney’s actions warranted cost
sanctions per § 1927. The court found subjective bad faith in counsel’s intentional increase of
costs, unreasonable multiplication of proceedings, and attempt “to ensure further delay and
forestall development."38 Ultimately, the court determined counsel intended to harass the ski
resort following the loss in Navajo Nation.39
Similar to the conduct enumerated in § 1927, the court found justification for sanctioning
a losing party under its inherent power, given the party’s improper or oppressive purpose in
litigating a claim.40 Again, sanctions in this context require a finding of subjective bad faith by
virtue of the party’s purposeful, reckless conduct.41 The court found that plaintiffs’ attorney
“willfully abused the judicial process by acting with the improper purpose of imposing delays
and costs on Snowbowl.” The Ninth Circuit court held costs sanctions appropriate under its
inherent powers accordingly.42
IV. CONCLUSION
In Save the Peaks Coalition v. United States Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit sent a
strong message that undue delay and expense, harassment, and oppression via litigation are never
acceptable practices. The shield of allegedly compelling science and unaddressed public health
concerns will not protect those who engage in such practices. By multiplying costs and delays
over two separate lawsuits concerning the same proposal and FEIS, plaintiffs’ attorneys
knowingly and recklessly harassed both the USFS and Snowbowl. The Ninth Circuit’s sanctions
against plaintiffs reinforce the systemic distaste for such overt abuse of the judicial system.
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